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‘The way we judge’ 
Observers’ assessing of elder care decisions of adult children 
who had been abused by the parents 
and the ultimate attribution error
Claudia G. Ammann
Abstract: In this essay I want to concentrate on observers’ baseline 
assumptions on how we should be, or should have become in order 
to	be	accounted	as	morally	‘good.’	I	will	point	out	the	significance	
for adult children who decided to not care for their elder parents. 
In three selected studies I show that observers, in trying to explain 
the decisions of others, or their moral development, respectively 
moral standing, misjudge or ignore their own implicit baseline 
assumptions. These assumptions are symptomatic of an implic-
it belief in all of us that wishes to see that ’good begets good’ for 
most	of	us,	and	infers,	thereafter,	that	‘bad	begets	bad’	for	some	
who	would	show	‘no	good.’	It	is	this	implicit	belief	that	guides	
the observers to make assumptions about the morally doubtful 
upbringing of a person, or their negative behavior that they wish 
to explain by flaws in the person’s personality. This biased belief 
says	“it	is	this	way,	and	only	this	way”,	but,	in	fact,	one	cannot	be	
certain about it. The baseline assumptions that observers bring 
along are basically the biased observer’s points of view which can 
be explained with the ultimate attribution error.
Keywords: elder care, child abuse, dilemmatic moral decisions, an ulti-
mate attribution error, care ethics
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“Care	for	my	parents?	–	Not	me!	If	someone	else	does	it,	
fine,	I	am	happy.	I	would	be	happy	for	them.	But	not	me.	
Not	that.	[…]	But	how	can	I	show	that	I	am	a	good	per-
son?	–	I	cannot!”1,
a	women	in	her	mid	40s,	a	victim	of	physical	and	sexu-
al abuse in her childhood years by her father, immediate-
ly sensing the question of elder care is not only a matter 
of solidarity and ambivalence alone, but also primarily an 
issue of morality.
The morally good member in society
Reporting about a community that put great efforts into 
living their lives in line with their beliefs without any out-
side	interference,	Cruz	describes	the	‘good’	member	in	such	
a community as someone who places “great value on com-
munity and considers family to be a building block of the 
broader	group.”2 They can rely on, but also need to give 
care and help within the community. “Mutual aid within 
the	group.	Older	children	look	after	younger	children;	neigh-
bors help each other. The goal is to live as cooperatively and 
as	peacefully	as	possible.”3 This exemplifies a good, simple 
life emphasizing the importance of community and the good 
moral character within.
One	may	wonder	what	happens	to	those	who	would	
not adhere to these principles of mutual aid and care, as 
mutual aid is only given within the group but not outside.
The adherence to some basic principles indicate that eve-
rything new, everyone outside, and different to their ideal 
has to be rejected. The good member may not show a lack 
of cooperation and no pro-sociality. The good member sim-
ply has to adhere to cooperation and pro-sociality.
1	 Woman,	46y,	victim	of	physical	and	sexual	abuse	in	child-
hood, about dealing with her perpetrator parents who need care 
and help, in an interview concerning the issue that the question 
of elder care, in context of solidarity and ambivalence, has to do 
with morality.
2	 Daniel	Shank	Cruz,	“A	Simple	Life”,	Eve	Lyons	(ed.).	The New 
York Times,	September	15,	2018,	p.	6.
3	 Ibidem,	p.	7.
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In this essay I concentrate on the observers’ baseline 
assumptions on moral standing, that are assumptions about 
how we should be, or should become in order to be account-
ed	as	‘good.’	It	is	our	assumption	about	morality	and	how	
it is ideally cultivated. I will systematically and critically 
analyze three selected studies4, of which two are theoretical 
contributions	in	moral	psychology	(see:	The	‘wanton’	ques-
tion,	and:	The	unmoral	trauma	brain),	and	one	is	an	empiri-
cal	work	at	the	interface	of	psychology	and	gerontology	(see:	
Bad	begets	bad	only),	and	I	will	point	out	the	significance	for	
adult children who do not care for their elder parents. We 
learn from the two theoretical contributions that the mor-
al to care can be interpreted in a somehow extreme way. 
Both	contributions	represent	extreme	positions.	They	are	
extreme in relation to the issue of a morally good charac-
ter, as in relation to the issue of a morally good upbringing 
and development. First, one position invites us to believe 
that a person’s negative behavior (no care) can be primarily 
explained by a morally flawed character of that person (the 
‘wanton’).	Secondly,	with	the	other	position	we	are	inclined	
to	believe	that	a	‘morally	sane’	person	can	only	develop	via	
a happy-go-luck childhood, as a trauma can nothing but 
deny a moral developing (the trauma brain). And lastly, the 
empirical contribution interests for the reason of its inter-
pretation of the data suggesting that a bad childhood will 
primarily point to an adulthood with emotionally unresolved 
issues, and an early trauma still active in a particular fash-
ion	some	50	years	later.	On	example	of	these	three	selected	
studies I will show that, in trying to explain the decisions 
of others, or in trying to reason on hand of the past life-time 
4 Searching for relevant literature that combines the criteria trau-
ma (with the focus on childhood development), care (with the focus on 
elder care), and morality, brings to the fore the Ethics of Care with, 
however, no specific mentioning of trauma. Care and morality com-
bined leads amongst others to the contribution analyzed in the first 
section	(see:	The	‘wanton’	question).	Care and trauma combined leads 
amongst	others	to	the	contribution	analyzed	in	the	second	section	(see:	
The unmoral trauma brain). Searching for empirical data investigat-
ing the long-term effects of early trauma on the parent-child relation-
ship,	the	contribution	analyzed	in	the	third	section	(see:	Bad	begets	
bad only) is selected for its longitudinal study signifying robust and 
reliable data.
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experiences of others or their moral development, observers 
do misjudge or ignore their own implicit baseline assump-
tions. While doing so, the observers lose sight of the potenti-
ality of other, alternative explanations that could contribute 
equally to that present day state of affairs.
All these studies show a much broader and more gen-
eral implicit assumption coming to the fore. All three con-
tributions	are	making	a	claim	of	‘good	begetting	good’,	
either implicitly or explicit. I consider their results impor-
tant to discuss, and I intend to show that their underlying 
assumptions, both in theoretical ideas and in empirical spec-
ulations do not necessarily hold true when tested against 
the logic of the argument, or the data and its explanatory 
power. Most importantly, these implicit baseline assump-
tions which observers bring along are basically the biased 
observer’s points of view.
The ‘wanton’ question
Daniel	Lapsley5 from the field of moral psychology sug-
gests that a person is not a wanton6 when that person “is 
someone	who	cares	about	morality”,	referring	to	Harry	
Frankfurt’s	introduction	of	the	word	‘wanton’	in	his	essay	
‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.’7	Lapsley	
writes:	“In	ethical	theory	it	is	evident	in	Harry	Frankfurt’s	
[1971]	account	of	what	it	means	to	be	a	person:	A	person	(as	
opposed to a wanton) is someone who cares about morality. 
A person cares about the desirability of one’s desires (sec-
ond-order desires) and then wishes to will them all the way 
to	action	(second-order	volitions).”8
5	 Daniel	Lapsley,	“Moral	Identity	and	Developmental	Theo-
ry”,	Human Development	2015,	vol.	58,	no.	3,	pp.	164–171,	doi:	
10.1159/000435926.
6	 In	the	following	I	will	refer	to	the	meaning	of	the	term	‘wanton’	
in	the	sense	of	Harry	Frankfurt’s	original	description:	“[t]he	essential	
characteristic	of	a	wanton	is	that	he	does	not	care	about	his	will”,	see:	
Harry	G.	Frankfurt,	“Freedom	of	the	Will	and	the	Concept	of	a	Per-
son”,	The Journal of Philosophy	1971,	vol.	68,	no.	1,	p.	11.
7	 Ibidem,	pp.	5–20.
8	 D.	Lapsley,	“Moral	Identity”…,	p.	164.
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In accordance with the woman at the beginning asking 
“can I show that I am a good person?”,	the	question	then	is:	
Am I accounted as a wanton when I do bad but still desire 
to	be	good?	Apparently	so,	if	I	need	to	believe	the	above	idea	
from moral psychology.
At first sight I should account myself a wanton. That is 
because	I	should	have	acknowledged	that	‘what it means 
to be a person’	equates	with	‘what it means to be moral.’ 
Every	moral act equates with a human act done by an mor-
al being.	Every	unmoral act equates with an inhuman act 
done by a unmoral being.	Doing	good	means	being	good,	and	
doing bad means being bad. Now, that I won’t care for my 
elder parents, in other words I am about to do bad, means 
I will become, or already have been bad. I have turned into 
a wanton.
Because	I	missed	“the	highest	level	of	self-understanding	
[that	is]	the	moral	point	of	view”9, I have missed to become 
“the	moral	person.”	I	have	missed	to	become	someone	whose	
“very	selfhood”,	according	to	Blasi10, “is constructed on moral 
grounds; it is someone whose desires reflect a wholehearted 
commitment to morality. Morality is essential, important, 
and	central	to	self-understanding.”11	Lapsley	interpreted	
Frankfurt12 in such a way that a wanton should be some-
one who does not care about morality.
However, according to Frankfurt13	a	person	is	‘some-
one	who	wills	what	he	wishes	to	do’	–	and	that	is	different	
to	‘someone	who	cares	about	morality’	as	Lapsley	suggests.	
9 Ibidem.
10	 Ibidem,	p.	165,	referring	nonspecifically	to	(a)	Augusto	Blasi,	
“Moral	Identity:	Its	Role	in	Moral	Functioning”,	in:	William	M.	Kur-
tines, Jacob J. Gewirtz (eds), Morality, Moral Behavior and Moral 
Development	(pp.	128–139),	John	Wiley	and	Sons,	New	York	1984;	
(b)	A.	Blasi,	“The	Moral	Personality:	Reflections	for	Social	Science	and	
Education”,	in:	Marvin	W.	Berkowitz,	Fritz	Oser	(eds),	Moral Educa-
tion: Theory and Application	(pp.	433–443),	Wiley,	New	York	1985;	
(c)	A.	Blasi,	“Moral	Character:	A	Psychological	Approach”,	in:	Daniel 
K.	Lapsley,	Clark	Power	(eds),	Character Psychology and Charac-
ter Education	(pp.	67–100),	University	of	Notre	Dame	Press,	Notre	
Dame,	IN	2005.
11	 D.	Lapsley,	“Moral	Identity”…,	p.	165.
12	 H.G.	Frankfurt,	“Freedom	of	the	Will”…,	pp.	5–20.
13 Ibidem.
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Frankfurt14 considers a wanton to be someone about whom 
you cannot say that this person is actually willing what he 
wishes for. He might will what he wishes to do, he might 
will not. He simply doesn’t care. He just does things with-
out	considering	about	his	will	too	deeply.	Frankfurt:	“The	
essential characteristic of a wanton is that he does not care 
about his will. His desires move him to do certain things, 
without its being true to him either that he wants to be 
moved by those desires or that he prefers to be moved by 
other	desires.	[…]	In	any	case,	adult	humans	may	be	more	
or	less	wanton	[…when]	they	have	no	volitions	of	the	sec-
ond	order,	[…].”15 Frankfurt’s term of a second order voli-
tion	refers	to	what	he	describes	as	‘I	want	to	want	X’	and	
expresses	hereby	a	real	wish;	‘I	express	it	to	the	outside	
world and indeed I really wish it.’ Those who do not express 
this	second	order	volition	(‘I	really	do	wish’)	might	end	up	
as wantons.
A wanton in essence is someone who does not care a pap 
for it. It is all the same to him. He is someone who does 
not	waste	a	single	thought	whether	he	‘really	wills’	what	he	
‘wills.’	If	someone	doesn’t	‘really	will’,	in	Frankfurt’s	logic	
does not do it of his own accord and of his own free will, then 
such	a	someone	is	a	wanton.	A	wanton	is	a	Johnny-Look-
in-the-Air, a good for nothing and a scapegrace, inconsist-
ent and untrustworthy, irresponsibly and lacking, according 
to Frankfurt a central element that is the second order voli-
tion. Frankfurt describes someone who wants his will to be 
as	someone	who	“wants	this	desire	to	be	effective”16, mean-
ing having volition of the second order. Today we might call 
this	authenticity,	or	‘Reflektiertheit’,	really	willing	what	he	
is willing for, and in consequence having a sense of respon-
sibility. That person wants to want X and expressed here-
by a real desire. The person shows that their desires that 
they externally express and declare are truly those they 
feel internally.
Frankfurt’s wanton, however, does not want all that. The 
external does not match with the internal. The wanton does 
14 Ibidem.
15	 Ibidem,	p.	11.
16	 Ibidem,	p.	10.
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not want his will to be, does not want this desire to be effec-
tive. And this is a different concept of wanton than the one 
Lapsley	is	suggesting.
Lapsley’s	wanton	doesn’t	care	about	morality.	Frankfurt’s	
wanton	doesn’t	care	about	his	will:
So, maybe I am not a wanton in a moral sense as Lapsley 
is suggesting, because that woman definitely cared about 
morality. And, probably I am also not a wanton in Frank-
furt’s sense because I show this second order volition: 
I want my desire to be effective when I wish not caring 
for my elder.
Yet,	Lapsley	continued	with	another	term	that	is	desir-
ability.	He	writes:	“A	person	cares	about	the	desirabili-
ty of one’s desires (second-order desires) and then wishes 
to	will	them	all	the	way	to	action	(second-order	volitions).”17 
In short, desirability should refer to the goodness of desires 
in the wider, external, social round. The person needs to ask 
themselves	‘Is	it	desirable	to	have	such	desires?	Is	it	moral	
to	have	such	desires?’	And,	‘Is	it	good	to	have	such	desires?’	
A person that is not wanting to care for their elder parents, 
is	needing	to	ask	themselves	exactly	these	questions:
Is it good? – No! Is it moral? – No! Is it desirable? – No! 
And, why is it not desirable? Because the social norm tells 
differently. The ultimate test has become the social envi-
ronment with its social norm. If they say ’No’, you have 
to say ’No.’
Looking	at	Frankfurt’s	essay	(1971),	however,	a	different	
conclusion	emerges.	At	first	sight	it	seems	right	what	Lap-
sley	concluded.	Frankfurt	writes:
“What	distinguishes	the	[…]	wanton	from	other[s…]	is	
that he is not concerned with the desirability of his desires 
themselves.”	In	such	sense	it	could	be	true	that	desirabi-
lity refers to a social round and expresses as social desi-
res or a social norm. However, in the very next sentence 
Frankfurt makes explicit to what the desirability should 
refer to, that is the agent himself. The wanton “ignores 
the question of what his will is to be. Not only does he pur-
sue whatever course of action he is most strongly inclined 
to pursue, but he does not care which of his inclinations 
17	 D.	Lapsley,	“Moral	Identity”…,	p.	164.
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is	the	strongest”.18 Frankfurt’s concept of desirability is 
a	self-referral,	so	to	speak.	Desirability	in	Frankfurt’s	sen-
se refers to someone who would not “ignore the question 
of	what	his	will	is	to	be”.19
By	contrast,	Lapsley	moves	desirability	to	the	external	
social	environment	the	agent	needs	to	adapt	to.	Lapsley	
makes desirability an essentially different term that is about 
good and bad. Frankfurt’s original desirability, however, is 
self-driven, not externally driven and therefore something 
completely different. The importance here is that the power 
of agency is still within the agent and has not shifted to an 
external social desire or norm.
In Frankfurt’s case the wanton has no will, no self-deter-
mination because he doesn’t reflect on his desires. The wan-
ton	doesn’t	ask	himself	whether	he	truly	desires	‘his	desires’,	
as does he not ask himself whether he really wants to do X.
We witness here, in my view, a mixing up of self-determi-
nation with determination by a social environment.
What an agent’s will is to be is not equal to what others’ 
will is to be. My desires, wishes, and quests are not equal 
to desires, wishes, and quests of my social round that are 
expressed towards me, and I should then follow. It makes 
a huge difference whether I should be concerned about 
a desirability of my social environment, or one about my 
inner desires and my will.
Someone	‘who	wills	what	he	wishes	to	do’	as	Frankfurt	
sees	it,	is	not	equal	to	someone	‘who	cares	about	morality’	
as	Lapsley	interprets	Frankfurt.
So, should I be accounted as a wanton when I do bad but 
still desire to be good?	Clearly	not,	even	if	in	Lapsley’s	view	
you	have	shown	no	caring	moral.	Lapsley	wanted	to	intro-
duce you to such concept when you willfully doing something 
‘bad’,	or	something	that	is	different	to	what	is	generally	
expected	–	the	‘good.’
Instead, you have, in fact, shown that you are someone 
who wills what you wish for (second order volition), and you 
would not have ignored the question of what your will is 
to	be	(desirability).	None	of	this	is	a	wanton	acting.	Lapsley	
18	 H.G.	Frankfurt,	“Freedom	of	the	Will”…,	p.	11.
19 Ibidem.
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cannot call you a wanton. And he cannot call you someone 
not caring for morality. Frankfurt, however, does not answer 
your question whether you are still allowed to desire to be 
good and moral.
The unmoral trauma brain
Another contribution20 from the field of moral education 
observes in our modern world worrying phenomena such 
as lack of cooperation and no pro-sociality. The psycholo-
gist	Narvaez	writes:	“Today’s	dominant	culture	supports	
species-atypical	nests	and	worldviews”,	and	continues:	“The	
[moral] underdevelopment of many persons today extends 
to missing capacities for relational attunement with the nat-
ural	world”,	concluding	“[a]	stress-reactive	individual	is	con-
trolled by her conditioned past, undermining her free will 
[and will] have difficulty with cooperation and social fit-
tedness,	and	[will]	live	as	if	among	enemies.”21 The earlier 
writing appears to be a fair description, yet the conclusion 
deserves further consideration because here we witness the 
formation	of	a	baseline	assumption	that	divides	‘good’	from	
‘bad’,	and	assumes	that	‘good	begets	good’	only.	But,	first,	
let’s turn to the explanation of Narvaez.
The author advocates for a moral disposition that is 
grounded and learned as early as possible in early child-
hood.	She	explains:
“A childhood spent in the human nest can be termed spe-
cies-typical; a childhood spent outside the nest can be ter-
med species atypical. We know what a species-atypical 
upbringing	does	to	baby	monkeys.	It	is	toxic.	[…]	Pups	
with low nurturing mother care during that period never 
properly	“turn	on”	the	genes	to	control	anxiety,	leaving	
them	anxious	in	new	situations	for	the	rest	of	life”22,
and	continues:
20	 Darcia	Narvaez,	“Seeds	of	Morality	Must	Be	Planted	Rightly”,	
Association for Moral Education,	March	13,	2017	(unpublished	pres-
entation).
21	 Ibidem,	pp.	5–6.
22	 Ibidem,	p.	4.
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“If we return to moral character construction, we can 
see that a child whose early life provides the full nest 
will form a different set of implicit schemas for inte-
racting in the social world from a child who experien-
ces repeated and extensive stressors in early life. With 
a species-typical childhood, the child will develop flexi-
ble, relationally-attuned skills that allow agility in social 
life [whereas] [i]ndividuals undercared for in early life 
will display a varying set of problems depending on when 
the	stress	occurred	[…]	and	how	intense	or	enduring	they	
were	in	early	life.”23
“True	«spoiling»	of	babies	happens	when	the	caregiver	
denies baby’s needs and, for example, makes them scream 
for attention. Then babies get used to using drama to get 
needs	met	and	become	unpleasant	people.”24 The result is 
a	“unagile,	unconfident,	fragile	self	[…]	controlled	by	her	
past.”25 The author emphasizes that the formation of a moral 
character in the early child development is generally miss-
ing in particular in those who had not had the favor of being 
cared for in early life.
These children, according to Narvaez, will never become 
‘morally	normal’	persons.	When	early	care	has	been	miss-
ing, then no moral character can emerge or develop, not even 
later. We do, however, not learn why the moral disposition 
should start as early as in an infant brain. She states only 
that	“learning	moral	dispositions	starts	earlier”26 without 
giving an explanation of why the infant brain should be 
already a moral brain. The adult brain, in this view, is mere-
ly the coping of what has been engraved into, and experi-
enced by the infant brain.
The author describes the wider implication of the neu-
robiological development in the infant human brain as fol-
lowing:
“We would all agree that babies do not yet have moral 
character.	But	implicit	systems	–	those	that	guide	
social perception, undergird worldview, and guide beha-
vior	throughout	life	–	are	initiated	from	the	first	days	
23	 Ibidem,	p.	5.
24	 Ibidem,	p.	6.
25	 Ibidem,	p.	5.
26 Ibidem, p. 3.
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of life. [as] neurobiological studies are demonstrating 
the impact of early experience on the brain structures 
that form our dispositions. For example, during early 
life the function of the stress response system is esta-
blished. With stress-inducing care the system will form 
in	an	overreactive,	underreactive	or	erratic	manner	[…].	
When the stress response is triggered, physiology chan-
ges	[…].	Blood	flow	shifts	away	from	higher	order	brain	
systems in order to mobilize flight or fight. The individu-
al becomes sensitive to threat cues. The individual can-
not	relax	or	be	open	to	others	or	to	new	ideas.”27
She continues, that later “[s]tress-reactive individuals 
become threat-reactive, perceiving threat routinely, and 
seek to reestablish a sense of security through any means 
possible.”28	The	result:	“A	stress-reactive	individual	is	con-
trolled	by	her	conditioned	past,	undermining	her	free	will.”29 
Narvaez believes that a moral character can only be culti-
vated by avoiding the above neurobiological responses. This 
clarification, however, of an individual primarily conditioned 
by her past, and the absence of early care for her, reveals 
already the dichotomized understanding of either good or 
bad early childhood experiences that inevitably must lead 
into an either good or bad moral character formation.
What the author is, in fact, describing here is the neu-
robiological developing of a traumatized brain.30 What the 
author, however, is claiming here is the neurobiological 
developing of a brain that cannot learn morality.
The unsettling insight here is the describing of the for-
mation of no moral at hand of the neurobiological trauma 
reaction in an infant, without learning why moral formation 
should start that early, respectively without the potentiality 
of	‘thriving	against	the	circumstances’	that	we	need	to	believe	
is	a	mere	exception	against	the	rule	of	‘bad	begetting	bad’	only.
Narvaez declares with a sweeping move the traumatic 
neurological mechanisms as the development of a non-moral 
27 Ibidem.
28	 Ibidem,	p.	5.
29 Ibidem.
30	 See	Christine	A.	Courtois,	Julian	D.	Ford,	Treating Complex 
Traumatic Stress Disorders: An Evidence-Based Guide, The Guilford 
Press,	New	York–London	2009,	pp.	31–59.
| 139| ‘The way we judge’…
character. While Narvaez describes the neurobiology else-
where explicitly as a trauma reaction31,	in	this	article	‘Seeds 
of morality must be planted rightly’32 her implicit assump-
tion become clearer. According to this view, we should 
believe (a) a direct analogy between trauma brain and mor-
al brain, with (b) some apparently wider implications for 
adulthood.
The direct analogy between trauma brain and moral brain
The neurobiological developing that Narvaez states as fun-
damentally important for the formation of a moral char-
acter, while in fact describing early trauma reactions 
in infants and children, is in fact a declaration of a non-
formation of moral. When a neurobiological development 
has taken place, that the author wants to have avoided, 
no moral formation should have occurred. When, howev-
er, no such neurobiological development took place, mor-
al formation should occur. Through this explaining she 
declares the formation of the moral character through 
a negation, respectively an exclusion. Trauma excludes mor-
al, and moral excludes trauma. Moral formation, herein, is 
the absence of trauma. And in contrast, trauma is the non-
existence of a moral character. While moral development 
is the absence of a traumatic brain development, a trau-
matic brain development is the development of no moral, 
respectively the lack of a moral development. Trauma hin-
ders moral development, it even denies the potentiality for 
morality. According to such view, a moral brain develop-
ment can only take place through the absence of a traumatic 
brain development, and every traumatic brain development 
inevitably will be the opposite of a moral brain develop-
ment. Such a view holds that only a happy-go-lucky child-
hood can guarantee a moral development, and only the 
opposite of trauma can become moral.
31	 D.	Narvaez,	“Triune	Ethics	Theory	and	Moral	Personality”,	in:	
D.	Narvaez,	D.K.	Lapsley	(eds),	Personality, Identity, and Charac-
ter: Explorations in Moral Psychology,	Cambridge	University	Press,	
Cambridge	2009,	pp.	136–158.
32	 D.	Narvaez,	“Seeds	of	Morality”…
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The apparent wider implications for adulthood
According to Narvaez, the adult brain “is controlled by her 
conditioned	past	[yet]	not	realiz[ing]	this”33, and has “diffi-
culty with cooperation and social fittedness, and live[s] as 
if	among	enemies.”34 In other words, a stress-reactive indi-
vidual does not possess the moral understanding and mor-
al	sensitivity	necessary	to	become	a	‘good’	moral	member	
in society. In this view, trauma is eminent for the later lack-
ing of morality and maturity in adults. The unmoral, or 
non-moral adult is someone who did not learn in early child-
hood	the	‘good	moral’	education.	The	non-moral	adult	is	the	
one character that has not learnt in early childhood already 
what	‘good’	morality	suppose	to	mean.	If	that,	however,	is	
correct, then any adult child with a traumatic childhood 
can be assigned as a non-moral persona. In this thinking an 
adult trauma brain is necessarily the one without morality, 
is the one that has difficulties “with cooperation and [will] 
live	as	if	among	enemies.”35 In this thinking the adult with 
a traumatic childhood experience has become the other, 
the unmoral person. This is what this thinking is promis-
ing. And such thought is deeply unsettling and worrisome.
A	Narvaez’	reader	learns	that	‘bad’	upbringing	in	child-
hood	inevitably	leads	to	‘bad’	developments	in	adulthood.	
However, what the reader does not learn from Narvaez 
but potentially should equally be aware of is that, while 
’bad’ upbringing in childhood is clearly unfortunate for the 
later	development,	yet,	a	‘bad’	upbringing	does	not	guar-
antee	a	‘bad’	development	later	on.	The	child	can	have	
developed into something good, or could have been resil-
ient	early	on.	Equally,	it	very	much	could	be	that	despite	
a	‘good’	upbringing	later	on	a	‘bad’	development	could	have	
occurred.	‘Good’	upbringing	should	not	guarantee	‘good’	
development	later	on.	And	equally,	‘bad’	upbringing	should	
not	guarantee	‘bad’	developmental	outcome	later	on	either.	
But	this	is	exactly	what	the	author	is	trying	to	convince	
us to believe.
33	 Ibidem,	p.	5.
34	 Ibidem,	p.	6.
35 Ibidem.
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For one, the author’s claim that a moral character can be 
cultivated by avoiding the above neurobiological responses, 
is in itself not troubling. In connection with her idea about 
the formation of the moral character, however, it appears 
highly questionable whether we can cultivate morality 
in people just like carrots in our gardens and they then just 
popping up to our liking. Morality does not work that way. 
Rather, the so-called moral character seems to be a secret 
trait,	a	‘Vexierspiel.’	It	appears	where	we	do	not	expect	it,	
and it slips and disappears where we expect it for certain. 
However, there are more precise definitions of morality. For 
example, a well reflected and trained ability to make moral 
decisions can replace spontaneous, intuitive, under-reflect-
ed and under-argued (or just routine powered) decisions like 
slow thinking that replaces (or should replace) fast think-
ing36 when a moral decision maker must deal with a more 
demanding moral challenge.
It remains puzzling why experts in traumatology point 
to the specificities of severe traumatization while experts 
in moral education make from there more broad generali-
zations	on	morality.	Explicit,	why	would	the	author	choose	
the early traumatic neurological reactions for a generalized 
formation	of	no	morality,	when	Courtois	and	Ford	describe	
these exact same reactions as specific patterns occurring 
in complex psychopathologies of severe traumatic stress 
disorders. They write, these survivors carry into adult life 
a malignant “self-loathing, the deep mistrust of others, and 
a	template	for	relational	reenactments.”37 These trauma sur-
vivors “develop neither a consistently secure working model 
of	caring	relationships	nor	a	positive	identity	or	self-trust”	
in their adult years.38 If following Narvaez, however, we 
should believe this specific, severe psychopathology is key 
for all abused adult children.
It is also puzzling why experts in traumatology can 
emphasize the positive while the author needs to stress the 
36	 See	Daniel	Kahneman,	Thinking, Fast and Slow,	Farrar,	Straus	&	
Giroux,	New	York	2011.	See	also	the	two	layers	and	two	aspects	of	mor-
al	reasoning	in	Georg	Lind,	How To Teach Morality,	Logos,	Berlin	2016.
37	 Ch.A.	Courtois,	J.D.	Ford,	Treating Complex Traumatic Stress 
Disorders…,	p.	xiv–xv.
38	 Ibidem,	p.	4.
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negative.	Explicitly,	why	would	experts	in	traumatology	
write so emphatically a manual for the road to recovery and 
betterment underpinned by the believe that “change in neu-
ral	pathways	is	possible	throughout	the	lifespan”39, when, 
following Narvaez, we should believe that such an endeavor 
is without avail as no moral character has emerged or devel-
oped, not even later. While acknowledging that “teaching 
old dogs new tricks aptly captures the increasing difficulty 
of	changing	[…]	behavior,	thinking,	and	emotion	patterns	
after	adolescence”40,	Courtois	and	Ford	are	equally	cognizant	
that trauma survivors “are able and capable in their adult 
lives	to	engage	in	‘healthy’	[…]	trusting	and	truly	collabo-
rative	relationship[s].”41 With Narvaez, however, we should 
hold the view that these children will never become ’moral-
ly sane’ persons.
Bad begets bad only. Examining Kong and Martire’s speculation
The following empirical study is one of several, investigating 
the potential link between childhood trauma and the later 
relationship with the former perpetrator parents who are 
now old. It is one of the more important studies as it utilizes 
longitudinal	data.	Kong	and	Martire	examined	the	question	
“whether and how childhood maltreatment affects adults’ 
relationship quality with aging parents and [its] subse-
quent	implications	for	health	and	well-being.”42 I will guide 
through the findings and analysis and elucidate the thinking 
of	‘bad	begets	bad’	in	which	trauma	is	considered	as	inevita-
bly leading into major psychopathologies in adulthood, even 
in an otherwise healthy cohort of adults.
The	Wisconsin	Longitudinal	Study	collects	data	from	
a cohort of adults who were seniors graduating from high 
school	in	Wisconsin	in	1957,	and	were	born	between	the	
years	1937	and	1940.	The	first	data	collection	wave	was	
39	 Ibidem,	p.	34.
40 Ibidem.
41	 Ibidem,	p.	31.
42	 Jooyoung	Kong,	Lynn	M.	Martire,	“Parental	Childhood	Mal-
treatment	and	the	Later-Life	Relationship	with	Parents”,	Psycholo-
gy and Aging	2019,	vol.	34,	no.	7,	p.	900.
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conducted	in	1993/4	when	participants	were	around	53	years	
of	age,	followed	by	two	other	waves	(2004/5	and	2010/11).	
Childhood	maltreatment	was	measured	at	Wave	2	when	
participants	were	roughly	64	years	of	age.	The	relation-
ship quality with the elder parents was measured at all 
three data points, as was psychological well-being of the 
participants.	Of	the	original	10,317	individuals	selected	
and	approached,	there	were	1,479	participants	at	Wave	1	
who	still	had	their	parents	alive,	162	at	Wave	2,	and	13	at	
Wave 3.43	Overall,	at	the	age	of	65,	in	retrospect	“less	than	
15%	of	respondents	reported	maternal	childhood	abuse,	and	
approximately a quarter of respondents reported paternal 
childhood	abuse.”44	On	base	of	these	data,	the	authors’	par-
ticular interest focused on “whether and how between-per-
son variability in later-life relationships with parents would 
mediate a history of childhood maltreatment and psycholog-
ical	outcomes”45, and they analyzed the connection between 
early childhood trauma (explicitly verbal abuse, physical 
abuse, and neglect), the relationship quality, and psycho-
logical well-being as well as depressive symptoms of the 
participants.
First,	the	results	impress.	The	authors	found	that	”adults	
with a history of childhood abuse showed lower levels of per-
ceived closeness with abusive mothers and fathers compared 
with	their	nonabused	counterparts”46, and they conclude 
that “[t]hese results are partially consistent with [their] pre-
vious work, which showed that reports of maternal child-
hood abuse and neglect were concurrently associated with 
a	lower	level	of	affectual	solidarity	with	aging	mothers.”47 
This is a particularly interesting statement as it would point 
to	a	view	that	says	‘broken	bonds	cannot	be	repaired.’	As	well,	
it would hint to something pathological that these relation-
ships	potentially	possess.	Kong	and	Martire	seem	to	affirm	
such	view.	They	gather:	“Affectual	solidarity	is	one	of	the	
most	important	aspects	of	intergenerational	solidarity	[…];	
43	 Ibidem,	p.	904.
44	 Ibidem,	p.	906.
45	 Ibidem,	p.	905.
46	 Ibidem,	p.	908.
47 Ibidem.
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affective	sentiments	in	a	parent–adult	child	relationship	
can enhance the psychological well-being of adult children, 
reduce conflicts within the relationships, and result in pos-
itive	outcomes	of	caregiving.”48 This affirmative statement 
is	not	wrong;	as	a	matter	of	fact	it	makes	all	sense:	affec-
tions towards the parents help reduce conflicts. In combina-
tion with the empirical findings, however, they point to the 
view that any adult with a family problem (a history of child-
hood abuse and weak affections, or lesser closeness towards 
their parents) must also have a problem with intergenera-
tional solidarity, as less affection or closeness equals less 
solidarity towards the elder generation. The combined state-
ments suggest that these adult children have missed to sup-
port the intergenerational solidarity they would have ought 
to support. The authors come to a conclusion that mirrors 
this view. They namely suggest, “the key to ameliorating neg-
ative caregiving outcomes may lie in properly addressing the 
relationship	with	the	perpetrating	parent.”49 As they argue, 
“practitioners can also help these abused adults become more 
aware that their relationship with an abusive mother may 
be a source of negative psychological outcomes. These inter-
ventions can help guide abused adults to address emotion-
ally	unresolved	issues	with	the	parent.”50
These statements indicate that abused adult children 
with less affection towards their older parents will not only 
lack the necessary solidarity towards the older generation, 
but also fifty-some years later after the abuse, they seem 
to	be	still	deeply	involved	in	‘emotionally	unresolved	issues’	
with their older parents. In addition, they potentially reveal 
‘negative	caregiving	outcomes’	that	are	directly	connected	
to their early abuse, as to their lack of affection and solidar-
ity towards the elder generation.
Then, however, when the authors re-analyze their finding 
in this carefully und thoughtfully conducted analysis, the 
previously significant associations vanish. “For a sensitiv-
ity	check,	we	reestimated	the	MSEM	model	using	the	orig-
inal	Likert-scale	measures	of	childhood	abuse	and	neglect. 
48	 Ibidem,	p.	909.
49	 Ibidem,	p.	910.
50 Ibidem.
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A	few	differences	were	found	in	the	mediational	associations”51, 
as	Kong	and	Martire	stress.	What	first	was	a	significant	medi-
ating associations “such that reports of having been verbally 
abused, physically abused, or neglected were associated with 
lower levels of psychological well-being partly through lower 
levels	of	perceived	closeness	with	mothers.”52 turned out be 
insignificant when re-analysed within the original numerical 
condition.”53 In the relationship with mothers group, reports 
of having been physically abused by the mother were not sig-
nificantly associated with perceived closeness with mothers 
at	the	.05	significance	level54 as they were with the dichoto-
mized	abuse	measure.”55 The results suggest that the believed 
existence of a connection turns out to be a connection of insig-
nificant means. There, where there should be lower close-
ness to the mother in connection to all three types of trauma 
(verbal, physical, neglect) and lower levels of well-being, was 
in fact not much substance to. Not being that close to the 
mother and personally feeling not that well seemed both to be 
connected, yet at the same time not to be connected to the 
earlier childhood abuse by the mother. The distant relation-
ship can have other reasons, too, and not only the childhood 
abuse. The unwellness can be linked to the early trauma and 
the distantness in the relationship, it equally could potential-
ly not be linked. The results would not tell.
Furthermore,	Kong	and	Martire	“did	not	find	significant	
associations between childhood maltreatment and later rela-
tionships	with	a	nonabusive	parent”56, or, explicitly, “[t]here 
were no significant associations between reports of paternal 
childhood abuse and the relationships with mothers, except 
that fathers’ physical abuse was associated with less fre-
quent	contact	with	mothers.”57	The	authors’	“speculation”	
about that last finding “is that there might be individual 
51	 Ibidem,	p.	907.
52	 “Verbal	abuse:	b	=	–0.06,	p	=	.010;	physical	abuse	b	=	–0.04,	
p	=	.020;	neglect	b	=	–0.03,	p	=	.008”,	ibidem,	p.	906.
53	 “Likert-scale	order	instead	of	dichotomized	order	in	the	first	
analysis”,	ibidem,	p.	907.
54	 “b	=	–0.08,	p	=	.088”,	ibidem,	p.	907.
55 Ibidem.
56	 Ibidem,	p.	908.
57 Ibidem.
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differences	within	these	parent–adult	child	dyads”58, indi-
cating again that early abuse should be deeply connected 
to a lack of affection and solidarity towards the elder gen-
eration,	as	to	‘emotionally	unresolved	issues’,	and	to	the	
potentiality	of	‘negative	caregiving	outcomes.’	They	write:	
“For example, some abused adults might be more attached 
to the nonabusive parent, particularly if that individual was 
also victimized by the partner and they developed protective 
strategies	together	[…].	Others	may	be	disconnected	or	even	
enraged toward a nonabusive parent who failed to properly 
protect	them	from	the	abusive	parent	[…].	Future	research	
might explore this complexity in the relationships between 
previously	victimized	adults	and	the	nonabusive	parent.”59 
This expectation may come true, it may come not, or remains 
speculation.
Several objections need to be made, and I will describe the 
problem	as	threefold:	Firstly,	the	measures	and	their	declar-
ative or explanatory power. Secondly, the authors’ implicit 
assumption	of	‘being	less	close’	in	relationship	as	being	equal	
to	‘low	solidarity’	towards	the	older	generation.	And	third-
ly, a further implicit assumption by the authors about unre-
solved emotional issues as ought to be ameliorated.
First objection.	The	measured	‘perceived	closeness’	
in	this	study,	and	‘affectual	solidarity’	from	the	other	study,	
are	in	fact	the	exact	same	single	variable	that	describes	‘rela-
tionship quality.’ These measures for the relationship qual-
ity originate from a theory that is elsewhere known as one 
of the means for intergenerational solidarity.60 It measures 
all in all the provided and received present time support 
into both directions, from parents to child and from child 
to parents, explicitly (a) instrumental support that is doing 
errands,	shopping,	housework,	repairs,	or	other	work	for/from	
the parent, and (b) emotional support that is giving advice, 
encouragement,	and	moral	support	to/from	the	parent. 
58 Ibidem.
59 Ibidem.
60	 Vern	L.	Bengtson,	W.	Andrew	Achenbaum,	The Changing Con-
tract Across Generations,	Aldine	de	Gruyter,	New	York,	1993;	see	also:	
Vern	L.	Bengtson,	Robert	E.L.	Roberts,	“Intergenerational	Solidari-
ty	in	Aging	Families:	An	Example	of	Formal	Theory	Construction”,	
Journal of Marriage and the Family	1991,	vol.	53,	pp.	856–870.
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“Are	you	close	to	your	parents?”.	And:	“During	the	past	
month,	did	you	give/receive	advice,	encouragement,	or	mor-
al	or	emotional	support	to/from	your	parents?”	If	you	have	
not	answered	‘yes’,	it	could	be	that	your	observers	make	
interpretations about the state of affair of closeness and the 
quality of your relationship with your parents that not nec-
essarily should reflect your reality.
To	be	clear,	the	results	of	‘affectual	solidarity’,	in	conjunc-
tion with early trauma and later-life well-being, concern the 
‚relationship quality in late life’, not the relationship quali-
ty of young children and their perpetrating parents. These 
results concern variables that measure the present day con-
tact frequency, and support exchange at both instrumental 
and	emotional	level.	But	both,	contact	frequency	and	sup-
port exchange, serve now in late adulthood as an explainer 
for dysfunctional relationship dynamics earlier in life.
Looking for a more profound understanding.	Kong	
and Martire’s speculation refers to the more immediate and 
time-near events and interactions in the domestic violent 
family setting that seemed unlikely in an older, more set-
tled relationships. An older family setting is not one with 
fresh wounds, but one with old, and crusted ones. To say, 
an	60	year	old	person	who	had	experienced	abuse	(physi-
cal,	verbal,	or	neglectful)	some	50	years	earlier	at	the	hand	
of one parent would be still more attached and protective 
to their other, nonabusive parent, or contrarily more enraged 
and disconnected towards that other parent, mistakes the 
value of maturity, time, and learning processes during adult-
hood. Given the data points (less frequent contact with the 
mother), maybe simpler, alternative explanations could hold 
true that we do not know.
Martin-Joy and colleagues61, for example, showed 
in	a	70-year	longitudinal	study	of	a	male	cohort	that	the	qual-
ity of the childhood environment, in other words the rela-
tionship quality with each parent, and the warmth and 
cohesion of the family was fading away into irrelevance 
61	 John	S.	Martin-Joy,	Johanna	C.	Malone,	Xing-Jia	Cui,	Pål-Ørjan	
Johansen,	Kevin	P.	Hill,	M.	Omar	Rahman,	Robert	J.	Waldinger,	
George	E.	Vaillant,	“Development	of	Adaptive	Coping	From	Mid	to	Late	
Life”,	The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease	2017,	vol.	205,	no.	9,	
pp.	685–691.
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in	later	live	after	the	age	of	52,	and	its	impact	on	coping	
mechanisms (defense mechanisms) diminished. They dem-
onstrated that maturity comes with later life, at a time when 
the old parents seems to have no bigger relevance any more. 
To	assume,	however,	that	adult	children	in	their	mid	50s	
up	into	their	mid	70s	are	still	deeply	involved	in	‘emotion-
ally unresolved issues’ with their older parents, is not sup-
ported by the data as it is not supported by the explanatory 
power, or declarative power of the variables.
We simply do not know whether childhood abuse is still 
an urgent matter in the lives of otherwise healthy adult chil-
dren	who	had	been	65	years	of	age	on	average	when	they	
gave	account	to	their	traumatic	childhood	(at	Wave	2).	We	
simply do not know because we did not ask them directly 
for that connection.
Second objection. When in fact we should believe that 
abused	adult	children	in	their	mid	50s	up	into	their	mid	70s	
are	still	deeply	involved	in	‘emotionally	unresolved	issues’	
with their older parents, then essentially we do so because 
we make the assumption that less affection with the elders is 
equal to less solidarity towards the elders. Accordingly, any 
adult with a family problem (lesser closeness or weak affec-
tions towards their parents, and a history of childhood abuse) 
must also have a problem with intergenerational solidarity.
Consequently,	these	adult children seem to have missed 
to support the intergenerational solidarity they ought to sup-
port. The unsettled reader will be inclined to think not only 
that	earlier	‘broken	bonds’	could	never	be	repaired,	but	
also need to believe that these adult children are unable 
to form any close relationships with their parents, and lack 
that level of affectual solidarity that would be necessary 
to hold these relationships. Any abused adult who shows 
less affection towards their parents will have a major prob-
lem because then these less affections do not only show that 
they seem to have no real interest in reducing conflicts with 
their older parents, but more importantly, it suggest that the 
adult child is, was, and remains a unforgiving, and unforget-
ting person. The lower levels of affectivity and closeness can 
be held against all those abused adults who report low affec-
tivity as they would show lower degrees of affectual solidar-
ity towards their elders. And this is a troubling implication.
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The reason why such unsettling assumptions come to the 
fore is due to the implicit equalization of affection and sol-
idarity.	Less	affection	equals	less	solidarity,	so	the	analo-
gy. However, the statement of those being less close in their 
relationship towards their elder parents should not equal 
to	‘low	solidarity	towards	the	elder	generation.’	For	one	
thing, the statement that affectual solidarity “is one of the 
most	important	aspects	of	intergenerational	solidarity”62 is 
not wrong. It is fair to assume that affection can be under-
stood as a building block for solidarity, in other words can 
foster solidarity towards the parents, and can help reduce 
conflicts	with	the	parents.	Yet,	for	another	thing,	the	
absence of affectual solidarity does not indicate the com-
plete absence of intergenerational solidarity.
Actually, the statement of participants of being less close 
in their relationship towards their elder parents is only 
a component of the construct of intergenerational solidarity, 
not the equivalence of intergenerational solidarity. It seems 
to be vital to point to these basal facts, in particular as the 
authors indicated that abused adults with less affection 
towards their older parents not only will lack the necessary 
solidarity towards the older generation, they also, fifty-some 
years	after	the	abuse,	seem	to	be	still	deeply	involved	in	‘emo-
tionally unresolved issues’ with their older parents.
Third objection. When the authors conclude that prac-
titioners can help these abused adults become more aware 
of their psychopathological relationship with their parents 
which “may be a source of negative psychological outcomes 
[and] help guide abused adults to address emotionally unre-
solved	issues	with	the	parent”63, they miss to see that in psy-
chotherapeutic	practice	the	patients/clients	bring	up	these	
issues by themselves already if it still worries them. In an 
otherwise health longitudinal cohort, however, these issues 
may, or may not be of relevance.
Kong	and	Martire	indicate	that,	fifty-some	years	lat-
er after the abuse, adult children seem not only still to be 
deeply	involved	in	‘emotionally	unresolved	issues’	with	their	
older parents, but also, in addition, they potentially reveal 
62	 J.	Kong,	L.M.	Martire,	“Parental	Childhood”…,	p.	909.
63	 Ibidem,	p.	910.
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‘negative	caregiving	outcomes’	that	are	directly	connected	
to their early abuse, as to their lack of affection and solidar-
ity towards the elder generation. These statements point 
to a view about a distantly, uninterested adult child showing 
no affectual solidarity, and an apparently everlasting psy-
chopathological dynamics in families where childhood abuse 
once occurring will show up again in adult children becom-
ing the new perpetrator. In all fairness, the author never 
use the explicit words elder abuse, elder neglect, revenge, 
or	malevolence.	But	their	implications	refer	to	exact	these	
terms, and hint to the potentiality of revenge and malevo-
lence. However, when the authors, in trying to get a holis-
tic understanding, advocate that “[f]uture studies should 
empirically test this speculation [of a connect between a par-
ticular past and a particular present] by examining a histo-
ry of child maltreatment, current relationship quality with 
aging parents, and caregiving outcomes all together in the 
same	model”64, they seem to be primarily of the view that 
a lack of care (e.g., elder neglect) can be basically explained 
by the direct connect to revenge and malevolence. As a mat-
ter of fact, according to the authors, the negative implications 
are clearly delineated for adults with a history of childhood 
maltreatment who continue their relationships with their 
aging	parents.	They	state:	“This	new	knowledge	can	serve	
to better understand abused adults’ experience and outcomes 
of	caregiving	for	the	perpetrating	parent.”65 No matter who 
to blame here, the perpetrating parent or the former child vic-
tim	and	now	adult	child,	the	overall	‘think’	about	the	whole	
situation	and	the	persons	has	settled	–	a	picture	of	ever-
lasting psychopathological dynamics in families emerges 
where abuse once occurring, will occur time and again. The 
pathology	of	‘no	contact’,	and	‘no	affection’	has	become	a	psy-
chopathology on side of the adult children. What, in fact, is 
happening	is	that	a	‘childhood	abuse’	becomes	a	label	for	
the whole rest of an adult child’s life. The adult child can-
not escape this label. They will be stigmatized, and will 
remain the traumatized, abused, and then abusing child for 
the rest of their life. And this is a problematic implication.
64 Ibidem.
65 Ibidem.
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As a conclusion, the finding of no convincing connect 
“between childhood maltreatment and later relationships 
with	a	nonabusive	parent”66 should be taken into consid-
eration more seriously, because we could have witnessed 
here a thriving despite the circumstances. To be clear, this 
is	no	promotion	of	abuse	of	any	kind.	Child	abuse	as	elder	
abuse	are	both	abhorrent	crimes.	But	we	should	turn	to	the	
matured victims, and recognize how they have advanced 
and prospered, and acknowledge their development. We 
should	give	them	at	least	a	fair	chance	for	‘normality’	(what-
ever normality may be), and should avoid individualization 
and pathologization of a problem that in late life is some-
times	labelled	as	‘having	had	a	bumpier	start	into	life	than	
others.’
Coming	to	peace	with	the	old	wounds,	or	letting	the	pain	
come	‘fresh’	as	ever	been	in	younger	years,	makes	the	fine	
line between thriving despite the circumstances and psy-
chopathology. These old wounds will never leave an abused 
person, yet, the degree of deep involvement, concern and 
attachment to that wound makes the psychopathological 
moment. It can very much be that in this very important 
longitudinal study there are single cases who may still have 
such deep involvements, concern and attachment to their old 
wounds. However, to generalize from the single case to the 
whole, otherwise healthy group is, I would say, far fetched. 
While it is certain that all of them who experienced a child-
hood trauma will carry that wound with them throughout 
their whole life, it should be emphasized that it is equally 
true that not all abused children develop a psychopatholo-
gy. The authors, however, come to the conclusion that “the 
current study further supports lifelong linkages in inter-
generational relationships for adults who were maltreat-
ed	as	children:	Dysfunctional	parent–	child	relationships	
persist until late adulthood in a way that undermines the 
levels of perceived closeness and interactions through con-
tact and social support exchanges with the perpetrating 
parent.”67 And that straightforward conclusion is a prob-
lem of an observer’s implicit biases.
66	 Ibidem,	p.	908.
67 Ibidem.
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The biased baseline assumption ‘good begets good’
What is a person’s moral standing when observers learn 
about the person’s decision not to care for their elders, and 
their history of childhood abuse, the relationship with their 
elder	parents	compromised,	or	broken?
It turns out an observer can become blind, and be pri-
marily lead by biased assumptions about the social world. 
In there they want to believe someone not caring can only 
be	one	of	those	who	do	not	belong	to	‘us’,	the	people	who	
care. They want to believe that an unfortunate upbringing 
does indicate nothing else but a morally flawed person lack-
ing any moral formation. It is the observer’s biased baseline 
assumptions that make them believe that abused adults’ 
present day decisions can be explained primarily through 
the	past.	Yet,	while	that	can	be	true,	it	equally	can	be	wrong.
The observer ignores the multitude of other, alternative 
explanations contributing to that present day state of affair. 
An adult child may have good reasons to feel distant to their 
parents.	But	no	matter	of	the	reasons	they	may	have	now,	or	
the sentiments they are inclined to feel towards their elder 
parents now, the observers assumes an inherent flaw in these 
families with a single past marking the whole rest of the adult 
life and the relationship quality between the generations.
To state, however, to know how a moral character is sup-
pose	to	be	(see:	The	‘wanton’	question),	or	how	the	moral	
character	suppose	to	develop	(see	the	Section	‘The	unmoral	
trauma brain’), as assuming solidarity to be primarily a mat-
ter of affection towards the elders, tells more about the sender 
of the message then the message itself. It tells what observ-
ers specifically like to believe about the social world, and how 
they wish the world to be. The observers’ baseline assump-
tions on people’s moral standing can in fact evince a certain 
belief system (implicit bias) that says that we all ought to be 
caring	human	beings,	and	we	all	should	aspire	for	hold	‘each	
other.’	Yet,	as	much	as	observers	like	to	see	each	other	as	the	
caring bit, and as much as they like to think that there should 
be a social glue between humans, this thinking tells much 
more of a desire, and a demand towards others than a realis-
tic describing. The baseline assumption reflects more of what 
observers	‘desire	to	see’	rather	then	what	‘there	is	to	see.’
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Interestingly, these baseline assumptions feed into a more 
general	understanding	of	what	the	English	simply	call	‘social	
cohesion’,	or	‘solidarity.’	For	one,	these	two	terms	are	used	
excessively in the present times, and in effect had suffered 
a fair bit of overuse, so that their meaning became worn-out 
and scraggy, almost withered and wizened with its best days 
gone.	‘Everybody talks about it. Nobody believes in it any-
more. But everyone demands it from the other’, as one inter-
viewee68 put it. The almost limitless use of these two terms 
in present times have lead to a multitude of different mean-
ings with the unsettling consequence of not knowing what is 
‘to	be	desired’	and	what	‘is	there’	in	the	social	world.
For another, it would be worth remembering that these 
terms refer to a more floccose thing of what we think we 
should do towards each other in order to understand our-
selves as a we.	These	are	believes	about	‘what	holds	the	us 
together’,	and	further	‘what	should	be	assumed	as	the	good	
in people.’
The inconvenient truth is that a term with a floccose 
meaning can imply assumptions that are basically biased. 
When biased, baseline assumptions about the moral stand-
ing of each member have serious and grave consequences for 
anyone who is not considered as a member. In other words, 
having some specific believes about the social glue will also 
draw a demarcation line between the us from them, that is 
the other, the outsider of whom we believe would not be like 
us, and who would not do like we would do.
Such baseline assumptions are symptomatic for an 
implicit belief in all of us that wish to see that ’good begets 
good’	for	most,	and	infers	thereafter	a	‘bad begets bad’ for all 
those	who	would	show	‘no good.’ It is this implicit belief that 
guides the observers to make presumptions, assumptions, 
interpretations, and speculation about the morally doubt-
ful upbringing of a person, their negative behavior that is 
explained by flaws in their personality.
The	biased	belief	says	“it	is	this	way,	and	only	this	way”.	
The biased belief states so but cannot be certain about 
whether it is truly that way.
68	 Man,	64y,	no	domestic	violence	background,	conversing	on	elder	
care in the context of solidarity and ambivalence.
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The fundamental error of interpretation about the baseline assumption ‘good begets good’. 
 The ultimate attribution error
This	section	will	advocate	for	the	following	claim:	an	observ-
er’s view is basically a prejudiced belief. The observer’s base-
line assumption is one in which they need to believe that 
‘good	begets	good’	only,	with	only	ingroup	members	capable	
and	able	to	hold	up	to	that	aspiration.	Everyone	else	is	to	be	
blamed as different, and belonging to the bad only. I will 
illustrate this belief by means of a cognitive bias called the 
ultimate attribution error.
Pettigrew69	proposed	the	ultimate	attribution	error	(see:	
correspondence bias) as an extension of the earlier known 
fundamental attribution error in reference to a phenomenon 
in which “a person who is disliked or hated may well be viewed 
as responsible for bad behaviors and not responsible for good 
ones.”70 The term describes the observers’ consistent under-
estimations of situational pressures and overestimations 
of	actors’	personal	dispositions	on	their	behavior.”71 Granting 
someone different the benefit of a doubt seems difficult to do.
Delineating	his	work	with	Gordon	Allport,	Pettigrew	
described prejudiced individuals as generally attributing 
“positive behavior by themselves as dispositionally caused, 
as further evidence of their being decent, upstanding human 
beings. [However], the same anti-social behavior that would 
qualify within a social group as out-of-role will frequently 
be seen as in-role across social groups if it matches hostile 
stereotypes	and	expectations.”72 The ultimate attribution 
error concerns a whole group, not only a person as it would 
be with the correspondence bias. This bias goes further. 
It labels on a group level the sheer existence of an outsid-
er’s unwanted behavior as prototypical for a whole group. 
69	 Thomas	F.	Pettigrew,	“The	Ultimate	Attribution	Error:	Extend-
ing	Allport’s	Cognitive	Analysis	of	Prejudice”,	Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin	1979,	vol.	5,	no.	4,	pp.	461–476.
70	 Ibidem,	p.	464.	Quoting	Shelley	E.	Taylor,	Judith	H.	Koivuma-
ki,	“The	Perception	of	Self	and	Others:	Acquaintanceship,	Affect,	and	
Actor-Observer	Differences”,	Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology	1976,	vol.	33,	pp.	403–408.
71	 Ibidem,	p.	464.
72	 Ibidem,	p.	465.
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Pettigrew’s describing brings to mind that the outgroup typ-
ifies the outsider who does not know anything about inter-
nal habits, rites, or could share the historical experience. 
The other is the stranger who does not belong to the us. For 
instance, anyone who is unlike the we, the carers can fall 
into the category of them, the uncaring people.
The ultimate attribution error is twofold in its explaining 
for prejudiced observing of (a) negative acts by an outgroup 
member,	and	(b)	positive	acts	by	an	outgroup	member.	Below,	
both negative and positive act will be examined in detail.
The ultimate attribution error for negative events and the insufficient care 
as a moral problem
The error for negative events occurs “when prejudiced peo-
ple perceive what they regard as a negative act by an out-
group member, they will [then] more than others attribute 
it dispositionally, often as genetically determined, (in com-
parison	to	the	same	act	by	an	ingroup	member).”73 Anyone 
who	does	not	‘do’	the	care	is	type-casted	as	a	typical	char-
acteristic of a no caring personality. Pettigrew put it this 
way:	“For	acts	perceived	as	negative	(antisocial	or	undesir-
able), behavior will be attributed to personal, disposition-
al causes. often these internal causes will be seen as innate 
characteristics,	and	role	requirements	will	be	overlooked.”74 
Then, someone deciding not to care because of their expe-
rienced childhood abuse, will, in the eye of the observer, 
not only show a negative, unwanted, and disliked behavior, 
but also exemplifies that abuse is still part of their person-
ality. In effect, that person will be considered a noncaring 
personality, and as someone who is a revengeful, abusive, 
and	egoistic	ignoramus.	Doing	has	become	being.
On	the	group	level	consideration,	this	bias	predicts	that	
not only those who simply do not care for the reason of their 
trauma, but also finally all those who would be just known 
for their trauma; as belonging to the group of trauma equals 
belonging to the group of non caring, abusive, or revengeful 
73	 Ibidem,	p.	461.
74	 Ibidem,	p.	469.
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personalities. According to this erroneous bias, the uncaring 
character refers also to all others with a traumatic past, as 
they also need to be identified as carrying the potentiality 
to not care. Then, the ones with the happy-go-lucky child-
hood can distinguish the us from them who are unlike us who 
do care. In effect not some, but all with a certain mark will 
be labelled and held accountable for their bad character. 
Belonging	to	a	group	as	sharing	a	certain	characteristic	
with others (e.g., the experiences of a traumatic child-
hood)	becomes	a	label	for	doing.	Being	has	become	doing.
The ultimate attribution error gives reason to believe that 
whatever an outgroup member is capable of doing, every-
thing and everyone belonging to that kind needs to be cast 
as persona non grata. In this belief, all who belong to us 
are	suppose	to	be	members	of	the	‘good	guys’	and	all	those	
who act differently, belief differently, have different reasons 
for their acts would not only not belong anymore to us, but 
to them	now,	the	‘bad’	guys.	When	a	person’s	negative	behav-
ior is explained primarily through their supposedly flawed 
personality, it seems inevitable to assume that a decision 
to not care showed primarily a morally flawed wanton per-
son75, or a bad childhood inevitably results in a bad adult-
hood only76, respectively a bad childhood as pointing to an 
adulthood of emotionally unresolved issues only, and the 
abuse as still an active part in their personality.77
When suggesting that “[t]he goal of moral identity devel-
opment, on the standard account, is the integration of self 
and morality; it is the integration of values with motivation-
al	and	emotional	systems”78, then there is no other way than 
to believe “the two developmental tracks [of self and moral-
ity]	are	ideally	conjoin[ing].”79 Such development would suf-
fice the view of the moral person although it does not make an 
exhaustive approach to the moral person. When “the highest 
level	of	self-understanding	implicates	a	moral	point	of	view”80, 
75	 D.	Lapsley,	“Moral	Identity…”.
76	 D.	Narvaez,	“Seeds	of	Morality…”.
77	 J.	Kong,	L.M.	Martire,	“Parental	Childhood…”.
78	 D.	Lapsley,	“Moral	Identity…”.
79	 Ibidem,	p.	164.
80 Ibidem.
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morality then can only demonstrate itself through a moral-
ly good behavior which can be illustrated by the ’competent 
care’ in terms of Joan Tronto.81 According to this scholar, 
“competence is the moral dimension of caregiving. Incompe-
tent	care	is	not	only	a	technical	problem,	but	a	moral	one.”82 
In this view any subjectively (i.e., intentionally caused by 
a carer) insufficient care would be a moral problem, and any-
one	who	does	not	care	in	a	competent	fashion	is	the	‘moral-
ly bad’ one who shows no integration of morality and self. 
Strictly, they have missed to integrate their motivation and 
emotions into a coherent value system as their motives and 
emotions had directed them to others decisions than the 
morally good decision. Their motives, emotions, and moral 
value system should have been one.
This is the way observer wants to see and evaluate a per-
son	not	caring:	these	persons	do	not	show	the	moral	prop-
er act. That person’s self and morality need to be assumed 
as dissonant, and their values, motives, and emotions out 
of sync.
‘A	person	who	has	not	experienced	enough	love	and	care	
early on, will become unable to be loving and caring for 
the rest of their lives.’ This is the view of an observer who 
commits the ultimate attribution error. It is, however, the 
wishful thinking of the observer to see a self with values, 
motivation, and emotions in sync with morals, and a care 
decision revealing a moral character.
Equally,	the	analogy	of	a	bad	upbringing	in	childhood	as	
inevitably leading to a bad adulthood reflects also the attri-
bution error. A traumatized brain is to believed the non-mor-
al brain that lacks moral. It will never, or has never learnt 
to be moral. The traumatized brain is unfree and inevita-
bly leading to an adult brain incapacitated, or free of moral-
ity. The prejudiced belief says a trauma brain (or a trauma 
mind) cannot develop morality.83
81	 Joan	Tronto,	“Ethics	of	Care”,	in:	Martha	B.	Holstein,	Phyllis	
B.	Mitzen	(eds),	Ethics in Community-Based Elder Care, Springer, 
New	York	2001.
82	 Ibidem,	p.	63.
83 See Michael Gazzaniga who claims our brains can be ethical, 
The Ethical Brain: The Science of Our Moral Dilemmas, Harper Per-
ennial,	New	York–London–Toronto–Sydney	2006.
158 | Claudia G. Ammann |
This	thinking	reveals	an	implicit	bias	that	says:	’good	
begets	good’	only,	and	‘bad	begets	bad’	only.	It	assumes	
that	‘good’	is	distinctively	divided	from	‘bad’	and	can	nev-
er	coincide.	‘Good’	can	never	emerge	out	of	‘bad’,	and	‘bad’	
should	never	emerge	out	of	‘good’,	not	even	time-delayed,	for	
example the one in childhood, and the other later in adult-
hood	years.	Under	such	view,	‘good’	cannot	coincide	with	
‘bad’	in	a	single	life	of	a	moral	person.	However,	a	moral	
mind does not tick as simply as the classical bivalent logic 
or according to the causative relationships.
But	for	a	biased	observer	certain	events	simply	can-
not occur. For example, an identity that has developed 
from victim to survivor, and a morality that still (or again) 
can include the good, is unthinkable for an observer who 
is	in	the	thick	of	his/her	ultimate	attribution	error.	Such	
an identity and morality cannot exist in the observer’s 
eye because a noncaring adult child hasn’t done the mor-
al development properly as she or he is not patching on 
the expectations of another moral agents including the 
observer.84
Any alternative imagined would be quite unsettling for 
the observer, as this would contravene their assuming com-
pletely. For the observer there is only one way of think-
ing:	Survivors	cannot	become	different	to	what	they	were	
before	–	that	is	being	in	the	midst	of	violence,	abuse,	and	
obsession. The survivor, in the observer’s view, can only be 
the predetermined initial victim within a cycle-of-violence 
that can only turn into a perpetrator who is repeating that 
cycle-of-violence, or at best remain the victim. Any alter-
native	thinking	seems	unthinkable:
The observer will want to need to condemn the very act, 
the person, and their moral personality. That is the ulti-
mate attribution error for the present day elder care ques-
tion.
Jean-Paul	Sartre	would	have	put	it	this	way:	“L’enfer,	
c’est	les	autres”	(the	hell,	that	is	always	the	other).
84	 Compare	“avoiding	expectations”	in	Gregory	F.	Mellema,	The 
Expectations of Morality,	Rodopi,	Amsterdam–New	York	2004,	
p.	39.
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The ultimate attribution error for positive events
The abused woman at the beginning asked, “can I show 
I am a good person?”	Was	she	right	when	she	answered	
no, “I cannot!”?
The error for positive events occurs “when prejudiced 
people perceive what they regard as a positive act by 
an outgroup member, they will more than others attrib-
ute it (in comparison to the act by an ingroup member) 
to	one	or	more	of	the	following:	(a)	the	‘exceptional	case’,	
(b) luck or special advantage, (c) high motivation and effort, 
and	(d)	manipulable	situational	context.”85
The manipulable situational context. Two cognitive 
(or socioepistemic) errors can occur here. First, the error 
to assume that an abused adult should be in the position 
of being able to care for their former perpetrators in a good 
way.	Yet,	nobody	would	be	able	to	define	for	them	what	that	
could possibly mean. They just need to show it, and observ-
ers	need	to	see	it.	Only	then	a	judgement	can	be	made.	What	
the observer does not see, cannot be categorized as good per 
see by the observer. They need to see it with their own eyes. 
Pettigrew in his original defining described “[a]n outgroup 
member’s	positive	act	[…]	not	as	a	function	of	effort	but	as	
a consequence of situational factors at least partly influenced 
by	others.	‘What could that cheap Scot do but pay the whole 
check once everybody stopped talking and looked at him’.”86 
Here,	an	observer	would	say:	“Look, what else should he do 
than care once everybody knows where he is coming from?”	
It is that observer who believes that only through their sur-
veillance the good care can be guaranteed.
The second error under a manipulable situational con-
text is the thinking that the abused adult child deciding 
not	to	care	is	capable	of	being	a	‘good’	person	only	because	
the observer has granted them that favor, or, in other words, 
only because of the observers’ goodness, grace, generosity 
and	nobleness.	They’d	believe:	’I will think good about you 
because I am a good person at heart.’ The acting person, how-
ever, can never acquire such good. They remain what they 
85	 T.F.	Pettigrew,	“The	Ultimate	Attribution	Error”…,	p.	461.
86	 Ibidem,	p.	468.
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had	been	before	–	the	bad	coming	from	the	bad.	The	situa-
tional context granted is one of only temporary means, the 
advantage will last only as long as the observer is motivat-
ed by her goodwill.
The special advantage. When attributing a special 
advantage to an acting person, this person “is seen as hav-
ing behaved positively and achieved a stereotype-breaking 
result, because the actor had the benefit of a special advan-
tage	conferred	by	virtue	of	the	outgroup	status.”87 Pettigrew 
details	cases	of	this	category	as	following:	“Black	Ameri-
cans have traditionally explained away positive behaviors 
and	outcomes	of	white	American	in	this	manner.	But	the	
generality of the phenomenon is suggested by the recent 
vehemence of many whites, including many who label them-
selves ‚liberals,’ against affirmative action programs for 
minorities.”88 In this thinking the abused adult child who 
decides to care for other some elders (but not their own) is 
believed	to	be	allowed	to	state	so	only	because	of	their	‘ben-
efit’ of their status of a victim. “They can say so only because 
of that abuse.”	The	observer	may	even	believe	these	abused	
adults get a special advantage of not needing to care for 
their elders, and observe it as a privilege conferred by virtue 
of their victim status. The special advantage granted is also 
one of only temporary means, as the advantage will last only 
as long as the abused adult is in fact caring for someone. If 
they	stop	caring,	observers	then	can	say:	“Oh, that’s typical!”
The exceptional case and luck. The sheer luck attribu-
tion assumes that “[t]he positive outgroup act can be seen as 
beyond the control of either the attributor or the actor and 
therefore	of	little	significance.	‘He’s dumb like the rest of his 
group, but he won anyway out of sheer luck’.”89 The observ-
er will not attribute any intrinsic good motivation to the 
good behavior of the adult child they believe as outcast. 
They	would	state	exactly	so:	“He just got lucky and didn’t 
get caught in doing the bad thing.”	In	this	view	it	is	simply	
not allowed to envision an abused adult as having grown up 
to	a	loving,	and	caring	being	–	if	they	had,	they	can	only	be	
87 Ibidem.
88 Ibidem.
89 Ibidem.
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accounted	as	an	exception	to	the	rule,	or	the	‘lucky	ones.’	
A no-care decision by an adult child should reveal the moral-
ly flawed person with values and emotions out of sync only. 
Yet,	in	fact,	it	is	the	sole	wishful	thinking	of	the	observer,	
or their liking to think that way.
High motivation and effort. When “[o]utgroup mem-
bers who work hard at being anti-stereotypical in their 
behavior are not seen as intrinsically exceptional, since 
they are perceived to be responding positively to aspects 
of the interaction under some control of others. They are 
not viewed as true exceptions, for they would return to their 
‘true’,	stereotypical	state	were	it	not	for	their	keen	motiva-
tion. [The] striving outgroup members are important exem-
plars	for	prejudiced	individuals	to	point	to	as	‘proof’	that	
discrimination and other situational factors are not respon-
sible for negative behaviors and outcomes of the outgroup. 
‘They made it, didn’t they? So there must be something per-
sonally wrong with the rest of them’.”90. An observer would 
make such prejudiced assumption when stating exactly that 
“Well, even if … I am not so sure about the rest of them”.
The voice of the women comes to mind when she was ask-
ing “But how can I show that I am a good person? – I can-
not!”	Probably	Pettigrew	would	agree	with	her.
Consequential dynamics
Within	‘high	motivation	and	effort’	two	dynamics	occur,	one	
with the observes, the other with other abused adults.
The one dynamic concerns observers’ expectation that 
turn	out	to	be	too	high.	Expecting	the	morally	good	primar-
ily, and being not aware of their ultimate attribution error 
(ingroup-outgroup thinking), observers falsely deny mor-
al integrity to those who would not show a morally good 
behavior	(error	of	negative	events).	In	then	observing	‘high	
motivation and effort’ in some while needing to adhere 
to	their	belief	of	the	‘bad’	in	the	many	(error	of	positive	
events), observers will need to arrive at the expectation that 
‘motivation	and	effort’	should	be	clearly	visible	to	them,	as	
90 Ibidem.
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“[t]he	striving	outgroup	members	are	[…]	‘proof’	that	dis-
crimination and other situational factors are not responsi-
ble	for	negative	behaviors	and	outcomes	of	the	outgroup.”91
It’s not the circumstance that makes them do this way (sit-
uational factors of not caring). It’s not because we blame them 
(discrimination of not caring). It’s them that makes them do 
this way (the ultimate attribution error of not caring). There-
fore,	all	those	who	show	‘high	motivation	and	effort’	need	
to	be	watched	carefully:	Good	behavior	needs	to	become	best	
behavior	(though,	as	Voltaire	puts	it:	“the	best	is	the	enemy	
of	the	good”).	As	a	consequential	dynamic,	observers	can	be	
inclined to believe that they are allowed to expect the best 
from	those	who	showed	‘motivation	and	effort.’
The	‘inside-good-outside-bad’	will	demand	from	everyone	
who	wants	to	become	an	ingroup	member	a	‘beyond-good’	
behavior, a behavior that is supreme and excellent, and 
stands out unparalleled to any other behavior. In the eyes 
of the watchful observers they should be able to show the 
‘good’	consistently	over	time	and	space.	They	need	to	show	it	
in every situation, with every person, at any time. They need 
to	show	the	‘best’	in	order	to	be	qualified	as	the	ordinary,	or	
the	‘good.’	What	suppose	to	be	evaluated	in	the	end	as	‘normal	
and good’ caring behavior, should present itself in the exu-
berance, the better and the best. The morally good behavior 
should	be	‘more’	of	the	good,	‘more’	and	‘better’	than	expect-
ed, outstanding, excel, and shine. In effect, it should exempli-
fy that the person has transformed, changed, and undergone 
a metamorphosis. This, however, is an oxymoron.
The dynamic in the observers’ expectation reveals their 
implicit error of interpretation about the moral development 
of the abused adult that should mirror the moral develop-
ment	of	the	‘normal.’	The	observer,	in	expecting	the	good	‘as	
usual’,	is	in	fact	calling	for	the	good	‘as	never	seen	before.’	
Not only is that expectation clearly unrealistic, it exemplifies 
the dynamic within observers’ ultimate attribution error.
Another dynamic concerns other abused adults who don’t 
want to be stereotyped either, or don’t want to lose their 
moral reputation. In reaction to the attributing of ’high 
motivation and effort’, other abused adults will realize 
91 Ibidem.
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the	following:	they	either	(1)	have	to	excel	in	the	caring	
task,	or	(2)	they	need	to	keep	their	childhood	abuse	secret. 
In	detail:
(1)	Other	abused	adults	witness	that	observers	have	
attributed an abused adult as not being a morally good per-
son	because	he/she	has	missed	to	show	the	morally	good	
behavior. The moral integrity was denied to someone like 
them, once they are identified as abused adult children. And 
they	realize	that	only	‘keen	motivation’,	in	other	words	the	
outstanding, group-untypical behavior, can bring back their 
moral integrity. They realize further, it is then not the ade-
quate, caring behavior towards their elders, but the supreme 
and excelling of good care that will suffice.
As much as this realization of needing to evince the 
extraordinary is reflecting an intrapersonal dynamic, it 
equally reflects a social interaction. If abused adults want 
to demonstrate that they belong to the group of morally good 
people, they need to go the ’extra mile.’ This is the dynam-
ic	of	a	false	observer’s	expectation	of	‘doing good is being 
good.’	Otherwise	they	will	lose	their	moral	reputation	which	
their social environment (the observers) made quite clear 
to them. This is the dynamic of the false observer’s expec-
tation	of	‘same old, same old.’
(2)	In	reaction,	abused	adults	might	discern	the	observers’	
expectations towards them as unrealizable. In consequence, 
abused adults might be prone to hide their adverse child-
hood experience now as adults before an observant social 
environment, as they would not know how to realistically 
satisfy	observers’	expectations	(see	also:	congruence	bias).
Conclusions
I showed on example of three selected studies that observ-
ers, in trying to understand participant’s decisions, and 
reasoning of their past life-time experiences (e.g., child-
hood abuse), or their moral integrity (e.g., personality and 
character), misjudge or ignore their own biased baseline 
assumptions. The observer mistakes their speculations 
as real interpretations, that when tested against the logic 
of the argument, or the data and its explanatory power do 
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not hold true. Their speculations are in fact fundamental 
part of their personal implicit assumptions that make their 
baseline assumption, that is the believing of ’good begets 
good’ belongs to people of their same kind primarily, but 
‘bad	begets	bad’	belongs	only	to	those	who	are	not	of	their	
kind. While doing so, the observers miss to consider oth-
er alternative explanations that contributes to that present 
day state of affair, and they lose sight of the potentiality 
that a bad childhood does not determine inevitably a bad 
present adulthood.
Considering	someone	not	living	up	to	their	responsibil-
ities assumes a certain belief system in those who make 
these	considerations.	Observers	who	consider	such	spec-
ulations have some implicit baseline assumptions (bias-
es) that grounds their speculations and interpretations on 
the observed person, and their inner and wider social con-
text that is family and community. Here I showed that the 
implicit baseline assumption concerns the caring human 
being and occurs whenever interpretations want to be made 
about a personal past, or the personal moral upbringing. The 
implicit belief holds true that we all care, respectively sup-
pose to care if need there be.
These baseline assumptions, however, shows that we 
only	like	to	believe	that	we	all	care	–	yet,	we	cannot	be	cer-
tain about that. We rather like to envision this belief as 
a normative statement, yet we cannot be sure about that 
either. Normative beliefs can change pretty fast. When Har-
ry Frankfurt92 made his statement of what it means to be 
a	person	half	a	century	ago	in	the	early	1970s	there	was	
merely the talk about morality and the caring human being, 
but primarily the talk about experience and responsibility. 
What the cognitive bias, however, can remind us of, is that 
we only wish to see, yet can never be certain about wheth-
er we see in fact a morally good character.
One	only	may	wish	to	see	proven	that	there	are	basically	
morally good people and their affectual solidarity towards 
their	parents	when	our	underlying	assumption	is	‘all	will	
care’	(Section:	Bad	begets	bad).	It	is	our	biased	believe	to	like	
to	see	‘all	are	good	who	care’	(Section:	The	wanton	question).	
92	 H.G.	Frankfurt,	“Freedom	of	the	Will…”.
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We also only wish to see a good moral development when 
suggesting	that	‘we	are	all	caring	people	because	we	had	
been	cared	for’	(Section:	The	unmoral	trauma	brain).
Any observer, who perseveres the belief of morally flawed 
personalities and morally doubtful upbringings, forgets their 
arguing is also potentially based on their prejudiced beliefs. 
The observer’s baseline assumption is one in which they 
want	to	believe	that	‘good	begets	good’	with	only	ingroup	
members capable and able to hold up to that aspiration, and 
everyone	else	can	be	blamed	as	different,	and	‘bad.’	But	it	is	
not an absolute one. As long as data had not corrupted the 
researchers, and showed that suddenly all people turned out 
to have become bad, one may continue in believing in the 
‘good.’	But	this	assumption	can	also	be	a	mere	illusion,	and	
the blurred, biased vision of those who observe others.
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